

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
COURT OF APPEALS

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In the Matter of TOMJUAN L. PRITCHETT, Minor.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TOMMIE PRITCHETT, SR.,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

LACHELLE BEATRICE GARNER,

Respondent.

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UNPUBLISHED

February 18, 2000

No. 214483

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 97-351085

Before: O'Connell, P.J., and Meter and T. G. Hicks\*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent-appellant appeals by delayed leave granted from the family court order terminating his parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.

We conclude that the termination petition was sufficient to provide respondent-appellant with notice of the proofs involved with respect to §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, we reject respondent-appellant's claim that his due process rights were violated. See *In re Perry*, 193 Mich App 648, 651; 484 NW2d 768 (1992).

Next, the family court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974; *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Only one statutory ground is necessary. *In re Huisman*, 230 Mich App 372, 385; 584 NW2d 349 (1998).

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\* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Contrary to what respondent-appellant argues, the record does not indicate that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite respondent with his son. MCL 712.18f; MSA 27.3178(598.18f). Because respondent-appellant failed to show that termination was clearly not in the child's best interests, MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Hall-Smith*, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997), the family court did not err in terminating respondent-appellant's parental rights to the child.

Affirmed.

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Timothy G. Hicks

<sup>1</sup> We note that petitioner's closing argument makes clear that termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights was sought under each of these three statutory subsections and that counsel for respondent-appellant, in her responsive argument, never questioned the applicability of these subsections on the basis of inadequate notice.